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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Russian Federation consists of 89 Federated units, namely republics, provinces (in 
Russian - krai), regions (in Russian - oblast), two federal cities (Moscow and Saint-
Petersburg), autonomous region and autonomous districts. Federated units are 
divided in municipalities. Along with the Federal Constitution there are fundamental 
laws in Federated units (republics have constitutions, all other units have charters). 
Municipalities (the level of local government) have charters. Each level has its own 
system of government. And at each level a referendum might be held. Local 
government approved their regulations on local referenda. Regional laws on 
referendum and local government regulations on referendum should be consistent 
with these requirements of the federal law, and local regulation should not contradict 
both Federal and regional legislation. Therefore, if regional laws were adopted before 
the mentioned Federal Law entering into force, their parts contradicting with the 
Federal Law should be amended. In any case, only those provisions of regional laws 
and local regulations can be used and enforced that conforms to the Federal 
legislation. 
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Direct Democracy: country-report on Russia
Alexei Avtonomov, LL.D.
Russian Federation consists of 89 Federated units, namely republics, provinces (in Russian -
krai), regions (in Russian - oblast), two federal cities (Moscow and Saint-Petersburg), autonomous
region and autonomous districts. Federated units are divided in municipalities. Along with the
Federal Constitution there are fundamental laws in Federated units (republics have constitutions, all
other units have charters). Municipalities (the level of local government) have charters. Each level
has its own system of government. And at each level a referendum might be held.
  
 Subject-matters of popular votes
The 1995 Federal constitutional law “On Referenda in Russian Federation” stipulates, that a
referendum in Russian Federation cannot be devoted to such issues as changing of a Federated unit
status; recall of the President of Russian Federation, or dissolution of the State Duma or the
Federation Council; prolongation of powers of the President of Russian Federation, or the State
Duma, or the Federation Council after expiration of their terms; postponing of elections or holding
by-elections of the President of Russian Federation, the State Duma, or Federation Council
members; adoption or amending of the federal budget; changing or fulfilling financial commitments of
the State; introducing, changing or cancelling of federal taxes or exempting from their payment;
taking extraordinary measures to ensure people’s health and security; amnesty and mercy.
All other issues can be subject-matters of referendum at a Federal level. Legal restrictions dealing
with subject-matters of people’s vote are connected with political and legal essence of a referendum
as a form of direct democracy, that is why these restrictions are aimed at efficiency of government,
on the one hand, and preserve from mixing up of different forms of direct democracy (elections and
referendums, first of all), on the other hand. However, some issues, that the Russian law provides
for to serve as subject-matters, to my mind, do not fit, if we analyse particularities of a referendum
as a decision-making machinery (I am going to say a few words about it in another abstact of this
report).
Referendums might be held at the Federal level, at the Federated unit level and at the local level.
So, subject-matters of referendum depend upon a level of government in accordance with separation
of powers between three levels of government in Russia (Federal, Federated units and local
government).
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The 1997 Federal law “On basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right to participate in
referendum of citizens of Russian Federation” provides for restrictions in subject-matters to hold a
referendum at a level of a Federated unit or at local level: it cannot be devoted to such issues as recall
of an elected officials and bodies, or dissolution of Federated units parliaments or local elected
councils; prolongation of powers of elected bodies and officials after expiration of their terms;
postponing of elections or holding by-elections of elected bodies and officials at a respective level;
adoption or amending of budgets; changing or fulfilling financial commitments of Federated units and
municipalities; introducing, changing or cancelling of Federated units’ and local taxes or exempting
from their payment; taking extraordinary measures to ensure people’s health and security.
By the present time more than 70 Federated units (of total 89) adopted their own laws on
referenda. Local government approved their regulations on local referenda. Regional laws on
referendum and local government regulations on referendum should be consistent with these
requirements of the federal law, and local regulation should not contradict both Federal and regional
legislation. Therefore, if regional laws were adopted before the mentioned Federal Law entering into
force, their parts contradicting with the Federal Law should be amended. In any case, only those
provisions of regional laws and local regulations can be used and enforced that conform to the
Federal legislation.
 
 Techniques and procedures for popular votes
I am describing here techniques and procedures for referenda, prescribed by the actual laws,
mentioned above. Earlier, referenda of 1991-1993 were held in accordance with previous legislation,
and procedures were different (for example, according to the Law of 1991, the Supreme Soviet
announced a referendum, that decided to be held by the Congress of People’s Deputies, if it was
initiated by 1 million citizens or by one third of all federal People’s Deputies; and in 1993 the
President himself by his own decree and his own initiative announced a Constitutional referendum,
which was inconsistent with the previous Constitution).
At the Federal level a referendum might be initiated 1) by 2 million citizens as a minimum under a
condition, that only 10% of them live in one Federated unit or in total outside the territory of
Russian Federation, or 2) by a Constitutional Assembly (a specially elected body, which can
elaborate and adopt a new Constitution), if it decides to submit a draft Constitution to a popular
vote.
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At the level of Federated units a regional referendum is regulated by regional legislation, which
can contain different regulation. However, the majority of regional laws stipulates that a regional
referendum might be initiated by regional legislatures and by groups of citizens. A required minimum
of citizens, who are supposed to sign a petition to hold a referendum, differs in different Federated
units, but, anyway, it makes several thousand people.
When an initiative belongs to a legislature, a proposal to consider the issue at the session should
be supported by at least, for example, one third (Vologda region) or a half (Voronezh region) of a
respective parliament members. As a rule a decision to hold a referendum is adopted by two thirds
of a regional parliament deputies. In some Federated units a certain number of municipal (district
and city) councils have the right to initiate a regional referendum. For instance, according to Moscow
region legislation, minimum of twenty three municipal councils can initiate a regional referendum.
The 1995 Federal Law “On General Principles of Local Self-Government Organisation in Russian
Federation” provides for, that a local referendum can be initiated by a certain number of citizens or
by a local council’s decision. All the details should be regulated by regional laws and municipal
regulations. But some regional laws and municipal charters in contradiction with the Federal Law
permit other institutions, beside mentioned above, to initiate a local referendum. Thus, heads of city
administrations in the cities of Khabarovsk and Astrakhan (Khabarovsk province and Astrakhan
region respectively), regional parliament and head of regional administration in Ivanovo region are
empowered to initiate a referendum. One should know, that in Russian Federation in case of a
contradiction between a Federal Law and a regional law or local (municipal) regulation, the Federal
Law has a major legal force.
It is clear, that any initiative to hold a referendum, when a big quantity of citizens are involved,
cannot take place in practice without a preparatory organisational work. So, only a group of citizens
or a political party can really organise a collections of signatures under a petition to hold a
referendum. The Federal Laws “On Referendum” and “On Basic Guarantees...” prescribe that a
group of initiators should be registered before they begin to collect signitures. A group of initiators
for a national referendum must consist of 100 people at least, for a regional referendum - a minimum
of 20 people and for a local referendum - a minimum of 10 people.
A collection of signatures may be organised by a political association (political party, political
organisation or political movement) as well. In this case a board of such a political association or a
board of its regional or local branch, independently upon a quantity of members in a board, plays a
role of a group of initiators. All political association at the federal and regional levels are specially
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registered by the Ministry of Justice of departments of Justice respectively. A political association,
who decides to try to collect signatures to initiate a referendum, should not have been registered by
the Ministry or a department of Justice later than six months before it declares about its intention to
start a collection of signatures.
After the initiative took place, a referendum can be announced. To announce a referendum means
to appoint in accordance with legal prescriptions a date, when a referendum is held.
At the Federal level it is the President of Russian Federation, who announces referendums. The
Constitution provides for, that the Prime Minister, who subsistutes the President, has no right to
announce a referendum. The President of Russian Federation should submit all the documents, of
which an initiative to hold a referendum consists, to the Constitutional Court within 10 days after
they were received. The Constitutional Court verifies these documents, if everything is consistent
with Constitutional and legal requirements, and has to return the documents to the President along
with its positive or negative resolution within a month. This Constitutional Court’s resolution has
to be published immediately after having been received by the President. If the Constitutional
Court’s resolution is negative, all procedures, aimed at holding a referendum, are stopped. If the
Constitutional Court’s resolution is positive, the President is obliged to announce the referendum
within 15 days on its receipt.
In the majority of Federated units referendums are announced by regional legislatures. As a rule
regional legislative bodies are unicameral, however several regional parliaments consist of two
chambers. In the latter case procedures of a referendum announcement in different Federated units
vary. For example, in Republic of Yakutia (Sakha) a decision to announce a referendum should
adopted at a joint session of two houses of the regional legislature. In Sverdlovsk region it is the
House of Representatives (one chamber of the regional bicameral parliament) which has the right to
announce a referendum.
In certain Federated units referendums might be announced by both the executive and the
legislative branches of power or by the executive branch only. For instance, in Yamalo-Nenets
autonomous district the regional parliament can announce a referendum on any issue except for
those that are prohibited by federal or regional law to be subject-matters of popular votes; and the
regional Governor has the right to announce referendums on subject-matters that the regional law
specially stipulates: such as changes in the inner administrative and territorial division of the district,
delegation of certain powers of regional bodies to federal organs, revision of certain regional
parliaments decisions, dealing with use of natural resources, environment and ecological safety of
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people in the district. In Republics of Buriatia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Mari El and in Chukotka
autonomous district regional presidents or heads of regional administration have the right to
announce regional referendums. In Republic of Dagestan it is the State Council, a collective governor,
which can announce a regional referendum.
The Federal Law stipulates, that a court can announce a referendum, if there is a lawful initiative,
which has been realised in conformity with all legally prescribed procedures, but the body, which is
empowered to announce a referendum, does nothing. It is considered to be one of guarantees of
enforcement of the right of referendum in case of unlawful arbitrary inactivity of certain state
bodies.
Local referenda are announced as a rule by a representative body of local government. In some
Federated units laws and municipal regulations empower heads of local administration to announce
local referenda.
A decision, by which a referendum is announced, has not to be officially published later than 60
days before a voting day for federal and regional referendums and 45 day before a voting day for
local referendums. Thus, it is quite enough time to think over issues presented for a referendum, to
discuss subject-matters, to organise campaigns for voting in favour or against.
An announced federal referendum cannot be postponed. It is not allowed to hold a federal
referendum voting at the same day as federal or presidential elections voting. What about regional
and local referendums, there is not a prohibition of that kind. Usually, voting at referendum and for
different elective offices is combined in one day in order to reduce spending and increase turnout. So,
regional and local referendums can be postponed for only one reason, which is to combine voting at
a referendum with voting at elections or with voting at another referendum in one day. But in any
case an appointed earlier referendum voting date cannot be postponed for more than 90 days, and a
decision to postpone a referendum voting day cannot be adopted later than 25 days before the date,
appointed earlier. A decision to postpone a referendum should be officially published with 6 days
after its adoption.
 
 Plebiscites and referendums
Referendum, being one of the forms of direct democracy, is an important mean of decision-
making. Emphasising of a people’s will through a referendum is demonstrative and a decision,
approved by a referendum, is morally advantageous for those, whose proposal has been supported
by a popular vote. However, a moral strength of decisions, approved by a popular vote, makes
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referendums attractive for dictators (as showed examples of A.Hitler in his early period of governing
in Germany, A.Salazar and adoption of the 1933 Constitution in Portugal, A.Pinochet and adoption
of the 1980 Constitution in Chile, etc.). A political will of people might be really expressed under a
condition of legally and actually guaranteed freedom of speech and mass media, as well as all other
rights and freedoms, political and ideological plurality.
Besides, there are certain technical limits for applicability of referendums, if one is going to use a
referendum as a really democratic decision-making tool. As a matter of fact, at a referendum people
can say only “yes” or “no”. That is why it is important to formulate such questions (as subject-
matters) that can be answered through a referendum definitely enough. Such questions might be like
following: “Do you want your country to be a monarchy?”, “Do you want your country to be a
republic?”, “Do you want your country to join (or disjoin) this international organisation?”, “Are
you in favour of five-year parliamentary term instead of four-year?”, etc.
What about draftlaws, the is different. Draftlaws have a complicated content, which needs
scrupulous work, elaboration and re-elaboration of articles, making changes after long discussions
and public hearings. As a draftsman of various laws at the federal and regional level I know, that in
many cases in course of discussions some drawbacks of the draft, which had been invisible while it
had been being elaborated, became obvious. At a referendum it is impossible to amend the draft. One
can support or reject it. What should I do as a citizen, if I like the idea of the draftlaw submitted to a
referendum, but I see that the draft needs further improvements? If I vote against, the idea itself will
be put aside and certain relations won’t be duly regulated. If I vote in favour, uncorrect formulas and
poorly eleborated provisions can spoil regulation of certain relations. What a dilemma! That is why
to my mind laws should be adopted by a representative body, using a special procedures. Some
basic laws and constitutions might be approved as a whole by a people’s vote after having been
adopted by an elected representative body, observing all necessary procedures. For example, The
Russian 1993 Constitution has certain inner contradictions between provisions of different chapters,
many of which might have been noticed and annihilated in the process of adoption, it it had been
drafted and adopted through duly procedures of several readings in an elected representative body (a
constituent assembly or a parliament) before being submitted to a referendum.
 
 Forms of government and referendum
Theoretically speaking, there is no organic incompatibility of referendums with almost all forms
of government, except for an absolute monarchy, but the latter is not actual for the contemporary
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world in general (we can find only few examples of countries, governing by absolute monarchs) and
for the Eastern Europe in particular (where all the countries are republics). As I have mentioned
above, what is extremely important for a referendum being a real decision-making machinery, but not
just a mean for manipulations of a populist dictator, it is a democratic political regime and
understanding of technical restrictions for an applicability of a referendum.
Russian history of referendums is not long enough (it is shown in the next abstract of this report)
to make practical conclusions about interconnection of a referendum and a form of government in the
mentioned country.
 
 Participation and turnout
Russian history of referendums at a national scale is quite short. The first Soviet Constitution,
which provided for a referendum was the Constitution of 1977. After it for the first time a provision
on referendum was introduced in the 1978 Constitution of Russia, which was a Federated Republic
within the Soviet Union. But referendums were not held in the Soviet Union (and in Russia as well)
under a pretext, that there were not a law on referendum, which should regulate its announcing and
organising. The Soviet Union Law on Rferendums was approved in 1991 only (the last year of the
Soviet Union existence). The first referendum in Russia was announced in 1991 to decide if an office
of a President should be introduced. The majority voted in favour of a presidential office
introduction. So, the first presidential election took place in summer the same (1991) year. This first
Russian referendum was not connected directly with any conflict within the governmental
structures. It seemed to be quite logical after introduction of an office of a President at the level of
the Soviet Union and to be aimed at further development of Russian political system. However
other referendums were used as a weapon to gain or consolidate a victory in situations of political
crisis and acute conflict between governing institutions.
The conflict between the Russia’s President and the Parliament (represented by two bodies: the
Congress of People’s Deputies, convoked from time to time and consisted of more than 1,000
members, and elected by the latter smaller but more influential because of its permanent working
status Supreme Soviet) developed into mutual jeopardy by the end of 1992. Congress argued the
legality of position, it was unable to get mass support and seemed to be loosing its legitimacy. In
contrast, Yeltsin emancipated himself from any legal limitations, claiming that he gained popular
legitimacy through his 1991 electoral victory. Yeltsin hoped to use mass support as a weapon in his
struggle against the Parliament, but he preferred a plebiscitary rather than an electoral way of
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conflict resolution. Since the end of 1992, Yeltsin suggested several times that a national referendum
should be held in order to gage public confidence in either the President or the Congress. He rejected
other possibilities to resolve this conflict, such as, for example, simultaneous and early presidential
and parlimentary elections. After an unsuccessful attempt to impeach the President in December
1992, Congress scheduled a referendum for April 25, 1993 with the following subject-matters: a)
confidence in the President of Russia; b) support of the government’s economic and social policy; c)
support for an early election of the President; d) support for an early election of Congressional
deputies.
The referendum campaign was accompanied by an unprecedented domination of the pro-Yeltsin
forces over the mass media, strongly attacking the Congress. The Congress countered by claiming
corruption in the government. Turnout in the referendum fell to 64,1 per cent (the whole electorate
was 107,310, 374 citizens; turnout - 69,222,858 citizens). But the President recieved a 58.7 per cent
rating (37,7 per cent of the whole electorate), and his goverment’s policy won 53 per cent (34,0 per
cent of the whole electorate). While 49.5 per cent of participants (31,7 per cent of the whole
electorate) voted for an early presidentional election, 67,2 per cent of participants (43,1 per cent of
the whole electorate) wanted an early parlimentary elections. According to that previous Law, a
decision, which needed further actions, was considered to be taken at a referendum, if the majority
of the citizens that made the whole electorate voted in favour of such a decision. That is why the
official resolution (May 5, 1993) of the Central Referendum Commission said: decisions were taken
at the referendum concerning the first two questions, because the majority of participants had voted
in favour of them; decision were not taken at the referendum with regard to the third and the forth
questions, because less than the majority of all citizens, who had the right to take part in the
referendum, voted in favour of such decisions.
Anyway the referendum wasn’t binding; it demonstrated nothing but public attitudes toward the
competitive actors. The plebiscitary mechanism, in contrast to elections, is unable to resolve
conflict. The referendum failed to create a framework for representative government based the rule
of law. Encouraged instead on his relative popularity (or rather the unpopularity of his rivals),
Yeltsin passed to plebiscitary domination based on the arbitrary rule, demagogically claiming that
his discretion powers had been delegated to him by people’s vote.
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Table 1. Results of the Referendum of April 25, 1993
Subject-matters % of participants % of participants
Yes No
1. Do you have confidence in Yeltsin? 58.7 39.2
2.Do you approve of the socio-economic policies of
the Government since 1992? 53.0 44.6
3. Do you want early presidential election? 49.5 47.1
4. Do you want early parliamentary elections? 62.7 30.1
After the referendum having been held, reform of the political system and a new election was
considered by the President to be inevitable. In addition to disputes on electoral system that is
supposed to be introduced, major disagreements between Yeltsin and the Parliament focused on the
separation of powers. Yeltsin offered his draft of the Constitution with a semi-presidential form of
government, in which a president is a key figure of the political system, while the deputies standed
for a republic, in which a srong prime minister, backed by a parliament, shares powers with an
universally elected president. The two constitutional drafts were incompatible and compromise was
impossible. Yeltsin launched a new coup d’etat. On September 21, 1993 Yeltsin issued decree No
1400 unconstitutionally dissolving the Parliament and called a new elections for December 12, 1993.
The Parliament, in accordance with the amended 1978 Constitution, responded by voting for
Yeltsin’s impeachment, after which Rutskoi as the Vice-President, who had been elected in one team
with Yeltsin in 1991, became automatically an acting President. Thus, got a kind of diarchy.
However, it was Yeltsin, who controlled the Armed Forces, militia (police), mass media, means of
communication, while Parliament deputies were besieged in the parliamentary building. Some
politicians and parties, as well as regional leaders, produced a plan for simultaneous early
presidential and parlimentary elections. But on Octobre 3, 1993 during a rally in Moscow,
supporters of Parliament became disorderly and tried to attack the major television centre. Yeltsin’s
reaction was quick and bloody. On October 4, army troops using tanks shot the parliament building;
according to official data (obviously understated), 146 people were killed. Leaders of the Parliament
and the opposition, headed by Rutskoi and Hasbulatov, were arrested and some opposition parties
were prohibited.
The Constitutional referendum of December 12, 1993, which was held simultaneous with the
parlimentary elections, might be called the “constituent referendum”. The new Constitution legally
secured the results of Yeltsin’s victory over the parliament. A presidential power was maximised
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while a parliamentary one was severely restricted. Since the Parliament has no right to form a
Government and to determine its policy, elections founded a new regime but didn’t provide for a
representative government by parliamentary majority (of one party or a coalition). Since the
referendum was far more important than deputies’ elections, it is not surprising that the distribution
of parliamentary seats wasn’t a priority for Yeltsin. He gave no explicit support even to loyal
parties (mostly, Russia’s Choice), and concentrated his efforts on the adoption of the Constitution.
Thus, the Constituional referendum provided new issue dimension: loyalty to the new political
regime. This issue dimension overlapped with major differences of position of parties within the
standard left-right continuum. The bipolar conflict between the President and the Parliament became
multi-polar, with a right-wing that is pro-government (Russia’s Choice, Party of Russian Unity and
Conciliation), a left-wing opposition (Communist Party of Russian Federation, Agrarian Party of
Russia), a right-wing opposition (Yabloko), and a nationalist group that nevertheless supports the
President and strongly advocates the new Constitution (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia).
The election results of December 12 were controversial. Turnout (54.8 per cent) was the lowest
in national electoral history. In Tatarstan and Chechnya, regional authorities organized a boycott of
the election in opposition to Yeltsin. Left-radicals also boycotted the referendum and the election.
The Constitution was adopted by a week “yes “:it was supported by only 58.4 per cent of the
eligile voters - similar to the support for Yeltsin in the April 1993 referendum.
Table 2. General Results of the Referendum of December 12, 1993
absolute figures %
Total electorate 106,170,835 100
Turnout 58,187,755 54.81
Number of ballots actually cast 57,726,872 54.37
Invalid ballots 1,357,909 1.28
Valid ballots 56,368,963 53.09
In favour 32,937,630 31.02
Against 23,431,333 22.07
Percentage of total valid ballots in favour of the
Constitution approval 58.43
Alexei Avtonomov: Direct Democracy in Russia
11
Table 3. Results of the Referendum of December 12, 1993 by Regions (%)
Federated unit Turnout Support of
voters, who
took part in the
referndum
Support of
eligible voters
Russian Federation 54.81 58.43 31.02
Adygueya Republic 61.73 38.24 23.61
Altai Republic 61.73 54.11 33.40
Bashkortostan Republic 63.74 53.12 32.37
Buryatia Republic 56.17 55.23 31.02
Dagestan Republic 57.58 24.88 14.33
Ingushetia Republic 46.09 56/02 25.82
Kabardino-Balkaria Republic 58.75 61.05 35.87
Kalmykia Republic 57.76 48.50 28.01
Karachayevo-Cherkessia Republic 71.90 27.45 19.74
Karelia Republic 54.74 69.88 38.25
Komi Republic 47.27 62.13 29.37
Mari El Republic 46.82 50.68 23.73
Mordovia Republic 62.13 36.17 22.47
Yakutia Republic 59.41 52.94 31.45
North Ossetia Republic 59.81 51.00 30.50
Tatarstan Republic 13.43 74.84 10.05
Tyva Republic 58.39 29.77 17.38
Udmurtia Republic 44.23 55.77 24.67
Khakassia Republic 45.63 56.58 25.82
Chechen Republic - - -
Chuvashia Republic 63.56 63.01 40.05
Altai Province 54.25 50.10 27.18
Krasnodar Province 56.71 51.16 29.01
Krasnoyarsk Province 52.17 56.93 29.70
Primorye Province 50.39 69.95 35.25
Stavropol Province 63.77 53.26 33.96
Khabarovsk Province 46.13 48.10 22.19
Amur Region 56.78 27.54 15.64
Arkhangelsk Region 58.20 71.61 41.68
Astrakhan Region 51.42 56.92 29.27
Belgorod Region 67.03 45.97 30.81
Bryansk Region 65.89 39.92 26.30
Vladimir Region 60.47 57.79 34.95
Volgograd Region 53.46 47.18 25.22
Vologda Region 59.98 67.95 40.76
Voronezh Region 59.92 44.20 26.48
Ivanovo Region 57.78 62.18 35.93
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Irkutsk Region 50.37 72.55 36.54
Kaliningrad Region 59.81 64.38 38.51
Kaluga Region 63.74 49.48 31.54
Kamchatka Region 44.09 68.15 30.05
Kemerovo Region 50.79 54.91 27.89
Kirov Region 58.57 49.48 28.98
Kostroma Region 59.69 56.63 33.80
Kurgan Region 61.21 56.12 34.35
Kursk Region 64.67 43.30 28.00
Leningrad Region 50.42 66.41 33.48
Lipetsk Region 59.95 41.31 24.77
Magadan Region 46.86 66.34 31.09
Moscow Region 54.77 58.49 32.03
Murmansk Region 50.96 68.07 34.69
Nizhny Novgorod Region 52.88 55.59 29.40
Novgorod Region 58.06 61.37 35.63
Novosibirsk Region 51.04 50.72 25.89
Omsk Region 56.74 57.24 32.48
Orenburg Region 56.05 56.37 31.60
Orel Region 65.67 39.85 26.17
Penza Region 62.64 39.93 25.01
Perm Region 46.00 77.54 35.67
Pskov Region 68.27 55.90 38.16
Rostov Region 56.47 51.50 29.08
Ryazan Region 66.16 49.28 32.60
Samara Region 53.39 56.87 30.36
Saratov Region 59.44 49.72 29.55
Sakhalin Region 49.70 62.38 31.00
Sverdlovsk Region 50.14 78.00 39.11
Smolensk Region 65.07 41.92 27.28
Tambov Region 64.24 41.16 26.44
Tver Region 63.92 50.04 31.99
Tomsk Region 46.00 66.26 30.48
Tula Region 60.85 53.37 32.48
Tyumen Region 48.22 67.77 32.68
Ulyanovsk Region 58.01 51.18 29.68
Chelyabinsk Region 51.43 75.02 38.58
Chita Region 49.33 54.98 27.12
Yaroslavl Region 59.26 64.36 38.14
Moscow Federal City 53.48 69.94 37.40
St.Petersburg Federal City 52.02 71.60 37.25
Jewish Autonomous Region 48.39 62.75 30.36
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Aga Buryat Autonomous District 63.27 65.54 41.47
Komi Permyak Autonomous District 56.36 66.24 37.33
Koryak Autonomous District 56.72 67.90 38.51
Nenets Autonomous District 63.00 68.00 42.84
Taimyr Autonomous District 58.47 79.99 46.77
Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous District 69.73 74.03 51.62
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District 38.91 79.82 31.06
Chukotka Autonomous District 54.00 74.10 40.01
Evenki Autonomous District 59.66 68.94 41.13
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District 46.94 78.77 36.97
 
 Influence of political parties, movements and other pressure groups on direct democracy
Generally speaking, political parties and movements, of course, can and should have impact on
referendums and other forms of direct democracy. In Russia, as it has been shown, a political party
or movement has the right to initiate a referendum.
The registration of new and existing parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), which had had a monopoly on political power in the Soviet Union and in Russia as well
and even on a political party title till 1990, began on the basis of a new Soviet Union Law “On
Public Associations” in 1991. 25 parties had been registered by the summer of 1992, although many
claimed no more than a few hundred members and there were no more than 30 000 active members
of all political parties put together. The new Constitution nonetheless made clear that post-
communist Russia was firmly committed to political diversity and a multi-party system, subject
only to the requirement that parties and associations refrain from a forcible challenge to the state or
from incitement to social, ethnic or religious strife; the same principles were affirmed in a new
Federal Law (now Russian) “On Public Associations”, entered into force in May 1995. A special
law on political parties themselves was adopted by the State Duma in the same year of 1995
(although later than the Law “On Public Associations”), but it was rejected by the Federation
Council. Still Russia doesn’t have a law on political parties.
Given their loose organisation, it was not surprising that many of the new parties divided into
smaller and sometimes hostile groupings. The CPSU had itself fragmented into as many as eight
distinct tendencies during its last years of rule, including a silent majority, and most of these became
independent parties in the post-communist years. Other parties remained coherent but at the cost of
a harsh internal discipline, such as the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevics), headed by Nina
Andreeva, which claimed continuity with the XIX Congress of the CPSU and refused to register
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with the ‘bourgeois’ authorities. On the other hand quite a strong moderate left party, supported by
a relatively big and stable portion of the Russian electorate, appeared on the basis of one of
fragments of the CPSU. This party is the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF).
It was equally clear that ordinary Russians were reluctant to associate themselves with the
parties that had begun to compete for their support. According to the survey evidence, just 22 per
cent of Russians identified to some degree with a political party, compared with 87 per cent of the
electorate in the USA and more than 92 per cent in Great Britain. Parties, indeed, were the most
distrusted of all the political institutions, and they were more distrusted in Russia than in the post-
communist countries of Eastern Europe. There were much lower levels of membership or
participation in the activities of political parties than in Eastern Europe, and there were
extraordinary levels of electoral volatility, even by post-communist standards: the shifts that took
place in voting support between elections in post-communist Russia were six times as large as in
Western Europe in the 1980s, and twice as large as in Eastern Europe. The Russian electorate, in
these and other ways, was very fluid, cleavage formation was indefinite and there was little sense of
patterned interaction or systemic character.
The weakness of parties (except for the CPRF, which has regional and local branches, its own
programme more or less distinct from programmes of other parties, historic roots, and more or less
stable voters’ support) in post-communist Russia was partly a consequence of the fluidity of social
structures, partly a consequence of the length of time that Russians had been denied an opportunity
to form their own organisations and to choose among them at the ballot box. It was also a
consequence of the political system itself. For a start, Russia had a strongly presidential system,
with a head of state who claimed to govern in the interests of the nation as a whole and who enjoyed
a mandate of this own; this undermined the position of political parties, whose purpose was
typically to mobilise a section of the electorate in order to achieve a parliamentary majority.
At the regional and local levels of government political parties are even less influencial than at the
federal one. And federal referenda were held (as it was shown) in 1991-1993, when the party
system was not yet formed and the majority of parties were at their founding stage of development.
The 1993 Constitutional referendum was held simultaneously with parliamentary elections, so
political parties were preocupied first of all with their own pre-election campaigns rather than with
the referendum. As I mentioned above, the procedure of referendum announcing in 1991-1993
differed significantly from the present one, and parties were not considered by that procedure as
organisations that can start initiating a referendum.
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Non-profit organisations, distinct from parties, can also influence results of a referendum. Such
organisations can promote a campaign to initiate a referendum, can launch a campaign to persuade
people to vote in favour or against. In the next abstract of my report I’ll give an example of not-for-
profit organisations role and actitivities in a regional referendum initiating and holding.
 
 Regional and local experiences
As a matter of fact history of local and regional referenda in Russia began along with the history
of federal referenda. Thus, for example in spring 1991 referenda in cities of Moscow and Saint-
Petersburg on introduction into systems of government of these cities offices of mayors were held
simultaneously with the All-Russia Referendum on introduction into a federal system of
government an institution of a president. As an introduction of an office of a President at the level of
Russian Federation, setting up of mayors’ offices seemed to be quite logical after introduction of an
office of a President at the level of the Soviet Union. Holding referenda concerning mayors’
introduction on the same day of a referendum concerning a Russian President office introduction
confirmed the idea of logical institutional development of the Russian (and even Soviet Union)
system of government. It was a Soviet political tradition to have a unified system of government
from top to bottom. And these institutional changes seemed in 1991 to be aimed at further
development of Russian political system at the local level. These referenda did not arise serious
conflicts and mayors in several Russian cities were elect the same year (1991).
Destruction of the Soviet Union destabilise the Russian Federal system too. In 1990-1991
Supreme Soviets of several republics within Russian Federation adopted resolutions on their
sovereignty. However Tatarstan decided to go farther. On March 21, 1992 a referendum was held in
Tatarstan with a question: “Do you agree, that Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, an
international law entity, realising its relationships with Russian Federation and other republics,
states on the basis of equal treaties?” The question had a double sense: initiators of the referendum
tried to avoid formulas, like “Do you support secession of Tatarstan from Russian Federation?”,
but at the same moment tried to find a formula, which might be interpreted as voting in favour or
against Tatarstan’s separation from Russian Federation. Even before referendum holding (March 13)
the Constitutional Court of Russian Federation recognised in its ruling this question to be partially
unconstitutional. However, the referendum in Tatarstan was held. The turnout was more than 80
per cent. The referendum results were the following: 61.4 per cent of participants (50.3 per cent of
the whole Tatarstan’s electorate) answered “yes” to the question, given above. By the way a
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portion of Tatars in the Tatarstan’s population is 48.5 per cent and a portion of Russians is 43.3
per cent.
Just now referenda at regional and local levels have become a routine decision-making procedure.
For example, 7 local referenda were held in the first half of 1998 only. On March 22, 1998 in
Vologda region two local referenda took place: the Charter of Kirilovski district was adopted and the
Charter of Totemski district was amended. On April 19, 1998 four local referenda were held in
Kamchatka region: the Charters of the town of Viliuchinsk and of Milkovski, Sobolevski, Ust-
Bolsheretski districts were adopted. The March 22, 1998 local referendum on the issue of a new
cargo seaport construction in the town of Gelenzhik (Krasnodar province) was proclaimed not to
have been held, because only 44.8 per cent of town dwellers, who had the right to take part in a
referendum, participated in a people’s vote. According to the Krasnodar province Law, a
referendum can be considered to have been held, if a minimum of 50 per cent of local electors has
taken part in people’s vote.
In order to make a turnout higher at regional and local referenda, people’s vote is held
simultaneously with federal, regional or local elections. For instance, on the day of the State Duma
deputies’ elections of December 19, 1999, different referenda in several regions of Russian
Federation took place.
An average rate of regional and local referenda in 1997-1999 in Russia was about a dozen per
annum. Many of them are held to adopt or to amend municipalities’ charters.
As an example of a regional referendum, I would like to analyse a referendum that took place in
Kostroma region on December 8, 1996.This referendum has several characteristics, which make it a
model one, which can help us to study tipical features of a regional referendum. A subject-matter of
the 1996 Kostroma regional referendum is an issue of finishing a construction of the Kostroma
Nuclear Power Station. Environmental problems are very acute for Russia, that is why a
construction of a big industrial or transport (like a seaport, for instance) enterprise or a power
station, that might worsen an environmental situation in a locality, draws attention of local dwellers.
Local and regional referenda on admittance (or not admittance) of enterprises’ construction are quite
common in Russia.
And now, a few words about a pre-history of the Kostroma regional referendum. A decision to
build an atomic power station in the Kostroma region was approved by the central Soviet Union
authorities in 1978. This power station was constructing more than ten years. However, after the
Chernobyl tragedy (May 1986) people became very anxious to have a nuclear power station in their
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neighbourhood. Democratisation of political life in end of the 80-s in the Soviet Union made easier
and more efficient people’s protesting. So, in 1990 the Kostroma Regional Soviet (Council) took a
decision to cease the atomic power station construction. But in the situation of economic recession
and increase of unemployment in Russia in general and in Kostroma region in particular local
authorities saw a way to stimulate an economic activity by continuing the atomic power station
construction. In 1992 a decision to continue the works was taken by authorities of a settlement
Chistye Bory and Bui district (where the atomic power station had been being built) of the
Kostroma region. Many people considered a continuation of the nuclear power station construction
not to be a good solution for regional economic difficulties. Opponents to that construction argued
that even the project of the nuclear power station was out-of-date by the end of the 80-s. New
technical regulations with new special restrictive requirements aimed at ensuring greater safety of
nuclear power stations were adopted after the Chernobyl catastrophe. The Kostroma Nuclear
Power Station project did not answer the mentioned requirements. On the other hand, there was
(ans is) lack of electricity in the Kostroma region, although some power station did not work at full
capacity.
Since 1993 activities against the atomic power construction have been developped by the
Kostroma environmental movement “In the Name of Life”, supported by the Russian branch of the
international organisation “Greepeace Council” and different regional public associations. They
insisted on holding a referendum concerning the nuclear power construction and explained to the
public opinion disadvantages of having a nuclear power station in the region.
In September 1995 a Law of the Kostroma region “On referenda on the Territory of the
Kostroma Region” entered into force. On December 28, 1995 the Regional Duma registered an
initiative group, set up to collect signatures under a petition to initiate a referendum with a question
as a subject-matter: “Do you agree with having an atomic power station in the Kostroma region and
with building it?” On January 2, 1996 another initiative group, created to help in collecting
signatures, was registered by the Regional Duma. They had collected and handed in to the special
working group of the Regional Duma lists with citizens’ signatures, 35,650 (6.04 per cent of the
whole regional electorate in 1996) of which were recognised to be valid. According to the mentioned
Kostroma regional Law, a regional referendum might be held by an initiative of a minimum of 5 per
cent of regional dwellers, who have voting rights. That is why on April 25, 1996 the Regional Duma
announced the regional referendum with a question as a subject-matter: “Do you agree with having
an atomic power station in the Kostroma region and with building it?” At the same time the Regional
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Duma decided to hold the refendum simultaneously with regional parliamentary elections, which
was planned to take place in the same year. The date of the regional parliamentary elections and the
referendum (December 8, 1996) was fixed by the Regional Duma Resolutions of September 5, 1996.
Active campaigns in favour or against the nuclear power station construction were organised in
mass media, as well as by publishing special printing materials by carrying out meetings, etc.
A voters’ list in the Kostroma region consisted of 590,351 names. 343,214 citizens (58.14 per
cent of the whole electorate) took part in the December 8, 1996 referendum. 35,830 voters (10.44
per cent of participants or 6.07 per cent of the whole electorate) answered “yes”; 299,600 citizens
(87.43 per cent of participants or 50.75 of the whole electorate) answered “no”. So, it was decided
by the people’s vote to halt the nuclear power station construction.
It is interesting to point out that in some districts of the Kostroma region a support for
continuing to construct the atomic power station was higher than average in the region. Thus, in the
Bui district 22.09 per cent of participants were in favour of construction of the atomic power
station. In the town of Bui 39.02 per cent of participants would like to have the nuclear power
station close by. It could be explained that the atomic power station had been planned to be
constructed in the Bui district, and many people were employed or were going to be employed at
the construction works or at the power station, when it was built.
Table 4. Results of the December 8, 1996 Kostroma Regional Referendum
District or
town
Whole
electorate
Participants Valid
ballots
Invalid
ballots
Blank
ballots
“Yes” “No”
Antropovo 7492 5723 5638 85 62 544 5094
Bui 7669 5320 5213 106 51 1186 4027
Bui (town) 26246 14137 13880 228 96 5542 8338
Volgore-
chensk
(town)
13223 7675 7508 163 70 825 6683
Vokhma 11109 7110 6949 158 100 1644 5305
Galich 9727 6631 6544 87 41 1644 5305
Galich
(town)
15492 8784 8521 260 115 604 7917
Kady 8655 5709 5520 166 99 581 4939
Kologriv 7460 5604 5428 176 90 384 5044
Kostroma
district
31816 18225 17880 333 121 1714 16166
Kostroma
(city)
220280 119776 117499 2033 909 7292 110207
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Krasnoye
Selo
15371 8980 8733 245 149 638 8095
Makarev 17079 10878 10711 262 132 810 9901
Manturovo 6285 4227 4049 178 54 395 3654
Manturovo
(town)
14998 7955 7694 217 73 650 7044
Mezhevo 4935 3757 3698 57 29 337 3361
Neya 14894 8457 8283 171 59 887 7396
Nerekhta 10615 6918 6773 138 72 859 5914
Nerekhta
(town)
21771 11463 11124 330 209 2181 8943
Oktiabrski 5213 3630 3528 101 68 812 2716
Ostrov-
skoye
11180 6461 6251 176 73 926 5325
Pavino 5306 3563 3498 63 30 608 2890
Parfenievo 6481 4781 4682 99 57 425 4257
Ponazyrev
o
8456 5633 5530 103 52 711 4819
Pyshug 4803 2971 2899 72 47 285 2614
Soligalich 9823 7770 7607 156 82 389 7218
Sudislavl 12008 7208 7027 175 81 733 6294
Susanino 7640 5397 5302 86 40 552 4750
Chukhloma 10972 7984 7746 173 102 990 5465
Sharya 11112 6660 6455 197 102 990 5465
Sharya
(town)
32340 13727 13260 427 190 1205 12055
Total
(Kostroma
region)
590351 343214 335430 7221 3455 35830 299600
